Promoting private entrepreneurship for deepening market reform in China: a resource allocation perspective by Chu, Son Ngoc & Song, Ligang
1 
Promoting Private Entrepreneurship for Deepening Market 
Reform in China: A Resource Allocation Perspective 
Son Ngoc Chu and Ligang Song1 
Abstract 
After more than three decades long of rapid growth, China’s economy is going through 
an important turning point from where structural imbalances in both supply and 
demand sides are being addressed for a more moderate and sustainable growth path. 
By focusing on the structural changes to its ownership—a central element in China’s 
economic transformation under market reforms, this paper highlights the importance of 
private entrepreneurship in deepening market reform and thereby driving the economic 
growth on a more efficient and sustainable path. Based on a perspective of resource 
allocation and a conceptual framework of entrepreneurship, the paper elaborates the 
evolution of the private sector and its performance in the context of ownership reform 
with comparison to the performance of the state sector. The analysis suggests that there 
is much further room for more productive use of economic resources, especially capital, 
land and natural resources by increasing the participation of private entrepreneurs in 
industries with high entry barriers in favour of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, a 
more competitive and equal access to productive resources through reform is needed 
for promoting more productive entrepreneurship and reducing rent-seeking activities 
which are conducive  to further productivity growth in China.  
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I. Introduction 
Market-oriented reforms in China have resulted in spectacular economic performance 
over more than three decades now. Transforming the enterprise sector has been a central 
part in the market reform process in which private entrepreneurs emerged and expanded 
rapidly with increasing contributions to economic growth and structural transformation 
in China.  
Despite the rapid expansion of the private sector in the economy, the state-led 
resource allocation has been an important part of China’s economic reform strategy, 
having exerted substantial effects on the survival of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
the evolution of the private enterprises. Focusing on capital, land, energy and utilities as 
key resources, we examine how the state has changed and reformed the institutional 
systems governing the supply and distribution of these resources during the market 
reform process. At the same time, we investigate the extent of outcomes that enterprises 
of different ownership types have experienced with respect to access to these resources 
and the policy implications. Firm behaviour and responses are examined in the sectoral 
and ownership patterns of investment activities, asset and output shares, and profit and 
productivity performance. This examination approach sheds light on the puzzle of 
China’s rapid economic growth with an expansion of the private sector in the total 
economy, but accompanied by the existence of and the predominant role played by 
SOEs in some of the key sectors in the economy such as oil, petrochemicals, aviation, 
steel, coal, finance, telecommunications and railways.  
State control of the development of capital, land and resource markets has in general 
created substantial rents that have been directed to important infrastructure projects and 
provision of public goods, thereby facilitating economic transition and contributing to 
rapid economic growth. At the same time, such rents have also produced side effects 
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caused by the state control of resources including rent-seeking activities by both 
governments and enterprises, worsening the ways by which resources are allocated. The 
misallocation of resources has been found to be linked with structural imbalances such 
as overcapacity in certain sectors, and significant negative impacts on the development 
of private entrepreneurship, which holds the key to increasing the productivity and 
growth potential of China (Deer and Song, 2012). 
II. Economic transition, state-controlled resources and 
entrepreneurship 
It has been long recognised that in a market economy, entrepreneurship drives 
economic growth through a ‘creative destruction’ process, a term coined by Schumpeter 
in the early twentieth century (Carree and Thurik, 2003). Development economics 
views entrepreneurship as a driving force of economic growth and structural 
transformation (Naudé, 2010; Gries and Naudé, 2008). This view is particularly relevant 
for a country in the process of economic transition from a centrally planned economy to 
a market-based one. The connection between the market and entrepreneurship suggests 
that market transition is always associated with the emergence and evolution of the 
private sector in the economy. The progress of market reforms can be seen in the 
expansion and diversity of the activities of private entrepreneurs (Tanas and Audretsch, 
2011). While there are commonly agreed traits of entrepreneurs, such as being alert to 
profit opportunities, creativity and risk-taking (Lu, 1994), the nature of entrepreneurship 
could be quite different, depending crucially on the institutional settings of an economy.  
1. The nature and types of entrepreneurship 
According to Ahmad and Hoffman (2008), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) defines entrepreneurship as a reflection of entrepreneurial 
activity, which is determined mainly by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are those persons 
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who own and manage businesses with the purpose of value generation through creation 
or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and exploiting new products, 
processes or markets. 
The OECD definition of entrepreneurship is consistent with an observation made by 
Schumpeter in the early twentieth century. Schumpeter (1934) considered 
entrepreneurship to be an innovative process in which entrepreneurs, as innovators with 
willingness to take risks, seek profits by creating new products or new production 
processes with better values to replace old ones, implying higher productivity. 
Therefore, entrepreneurship is associated with a value-creation process, which he called 
‘creative destruction’, which leads to true economic progress. In addition, introducing 
new products or processes is seen as creating disequilibrium in the existing market (Lu, 
1994). 
The Schumpeterian view of entrepreneurship which is called high-level 
entrepreneurship (Karlsson et al., 2004) is, however, rather narrow, as it focuses only on 
new value created by new products or processes. Other processes that are not purely 
innovative can contribute to value generation too. Kirzner (1998) suggested that, being 
alert to market opportunities, entrepreneurs can make profits through filling the gap 
between supply and demand in the market, either with production or with trade. By this 
equilibrating role of the entrepreneur (Lu, 1994), more value in terms of profit can be 
generated through contributing to flows of goods and services. This kind of 
entrepreneurship is called low-level entrepreneurship, and an example is firms in the 
wholesale and retail trades (Karlsson et al., 2004).  
The two early views of entrepreneurship miss an important fact: not all 
entrepreneurial efforts bring benefits to society as a whole, despite profits brought to 
entrepreneurs themselves. Baumol identified this feature of entrepreneurship in his 
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seminal paper (1990). Baumol suggests there are different types of entrepreneurship, 
including productive, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship, due to the reward 
structure created by a certain institutional setting with the existence of the market. 
Given a country’s institutional structure, entrepreneurs can take market opportunities to 
make profit with their talent. The entrepreneur’s market-based activities will create 
more wealth or value for society, making productive entrepreneurship. There are also 
profit opportunities in political and legal processes that could attract entrepreneurial 
efforts. The entrepreneurial efforts in political and legal arenas can accumulate personal 
wealth through changing government policy in taxation and subsidy; however, these 
efforts do not generate additional social wealth, but rather redistribute wealth, leading to 
so-called unproductive entrepreneurship.  
Moreover, in some cases, entrepreneurial efforts involve illegal activities, which may 
cause the loss of social wealth (though not necessarily losses of private wealth), making 
entrepreneurship destructive. Whether entrepreneurial efforts become productive, 
unproductive or destructive depends on how profitable opportunities are in market and 
non-market situations. The reward outcomes depend totally on the country’s 
institutional structure which determines the ways in which entrepreneurs are allocating 
their time and efforts. As Sobel (2008) elaborates, productive entrepreneurship is more 
likely to expand in a market-supportive institutional framework that is characterised by 
secure property rights, a fair and balanced judicial system, effective contract 
enforcement, appropriate business regulation and effective control of government 
power.  
An important implication of Baumol’s theory is that entrepreneurship growth is not 
always translated into economic growth and the healthy expansion of entrepreneurship 
is determined by a sound incentive structure of institutions. Baumol’s view of 
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entrepreneurship has particularly relevant implications for the analysis of 
entrepreneurship development in a transitional economy like China’s, in which 
institutional change to a market economy is central to the transition process. A 
transitional institutional framework may have created many non-market profit 
opportunities that attract those business-minded people who are able to exploit 
institutional loopholes and have become entrepreneurs under market transition. 
Moreover, transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-based one has 
created many rent-seeking opportunities that are conducive to unproductive 
entrepreneurship. 
2. Market transition and evolution of entrepreneurship 
Market transition is a long process with different stages of establishing the system 
with market rules and emerging private firms with different forms to those of state firms 
(Kolodko, 2000). While it is complex to delineate the transition process and 
corresponding entrepreneurship, a typology of different stages of transition with 
different types of entrepreneurship would be useful. Estrin et al. (2008) provided such a 
typology by suggesting three stages of transition in which different kinds of 
entrepreneurship exist. The initial stage or early transition is characterised by initialising 
market channels of goods distribution and abandoning planned channels of resource 
allocation. There are frequent adjustments of relative prices and gaps between demand 
and supply, creating opportunities for mainly Kirznian types of entrepreneurs—
entrepreneurs that perceive opportunities in a highly uncertain environment and 
unknown territory (Kirzner, 1973). As a result, there is a lot of uncertainty due to the 
unavailability of market information and macro-economic instability.  
In the second stage, uncertainty is reduced due to more market information, less 
extreme price fluctuations and a more stable macro-economic environment. The 
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fundamentals of a market system such as property rights are established, providing 
incentives for Schumpeterian entrepreneurship to emerge. The third stage would follow 
with further development of market institutions, which becomes the main force of 
resource coordination and information provision for market participants. Contract 
enforcement becomes more dependent on courts. Entrepreneurs can have better access 
to resources through financial institutions and market exchange. This stage of market 
transition provides an institutional environment conducive for the expansion of 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. As Estrin et al. (2008) noted, however, the early forms 
of entrepreneurship may continue to exist in the later stage of market reform due to the 
inertia of institutional changes with respect to market development and the required 
rules and regulations. 
3. Determinants of entrepreneurship 
In an analytical framework of entrepreneurship development, Ahmad and Hoffman 
(2008) suggested six factors determining the path of a country’s entrepreneurship 
development: regulatory framework, market conditions, culture, access to finance or 
capital, technological capability and entrepreneurial capabilities. The first three factors 
could create an overall environment for the emergence and evolution of 
entrepreneurship. A regulatory framework comprises laws and regulations that govern 
the entry and operation of business activities. A regulatory framework deals with issues 
such as business entry and exit, product standards, taxation, social health and security, 
safety, health and environmental protection. Market conditions are actually market 
opportunities created by the establishment and evolution of a market economy. Market 
opportunities are driven by factors such as competition, access to domestic and foreign 
markets and government participation in the market (supply of public goods and 
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procurement). A culture for entrepreneurship growth includes society’s attitudes 
towards entrepreneurs, and desire for business ownership.   
The emergence and expansion of entrepreneurship cannot happen without resource 
availability, which is determined by access to finance, technology and entrepreneurial 
capabilities. Entrepreneurial supply depends first on entrepreneurial capabilities, which 
can be established and accumulated by the training and experience of entrepreneurs, 
business and entrepreneurship education, and migration of entrepreneurs. Research and 
development (R&D) and technological advances create opportunities for entrepreneurs 
and their businesses to flourish. Technological capability contributes factors such as 
R&D investment, technological cooperation between firms, technology diffusion, 
development of information technology and a patent system; however, to take 
advantage of business opportunities and make a successful business, the availability of 
capital is the crucial factor. This factor depends on the entrepreneur’s access to financial 
resources such as a banking system, stock markets and other financial institutions.  
The above analytical framework would be useful for examining the nature, 
characteristics and performance of entrepreneurship in an economy with an established 
system of market institutions; however, there are some missing elements in the 
framework for a transitional economy. The analysis of the performance of 
entrepreneurship in transition would need to take into account two important processes: 
1) the process of setting up and building market institutions, including laws and 
regulations to recognise and ensure private property rights and to govern market 
transactions; and 2) the parallel process of ownership transformation. The next 
subsection will explain why it is important to incorporate these processes into analysis 
of entrepreneurship performance.  
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4. State control of resources and the development  of entrepreneurship in 
transition 
Market-oriented reform basically involves changing the relative role of the state and 
the market in the coordination of production, exchange and distribution activities with 
the main objective of improving efficiency and promoting economic growth. In China, 
like other former centrally planned economies, market-oriented reform started from a 
point of ‘only state, no market’ (Zhang, 2002, p. 10). At this starting point, the centrally 
planned economy is characterised by state control of all productive resources, from 
fixed assets such as plants, buildings, machinery and equipment to land and other 
natural resources. The state’s control of productive resources takes the form of sole 
ownership and is carried out through SOEs and agricultural collectives. While financial 
resources in terms of savings are limited due to non-market, state-coordinated 
transactions of goods distribution under central planning, production surplus is captured 
by the state through setting inter-sectoral terms of trade, mainly between agriculture and 
industry or rural and urban areas. Therefore, one crucial dimension of market-oriented 
reform has been the transformation of the state’s control of resources through ownership 
transformation of public assets, reducing the role of SOEs and changing the ways 
government intervenes in production and exchange activities based on market rules and 
orders. Consequently, on the one hand, market-oriented reform provides an environment 
for the emergence of entrepreneurship through market opportunities and the incentives 
attached to the establishment of private property rights. On the other hand, market 
transition gives rise to entrepreneurship through reducing the extent and changing the 
forms of the state’s control of resources—in particular, physical and financial capital, 
land and other natural resources.   
Changing state control of resources under market conditions gives rise to the 
fundamental question of the interaction of the state and the market. While it is generally 
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expected that the scope of state intervention will be reduced, an important observation is 
that in economic transition the state plays an indispensable and guiding role in the 
establishment of the market system, which aims to provide open competition for all 
firms. This is particularly true of China’s experience with its well-known gradualist 
approach to market reform. The leading role of the state is needed because market 
reform is basically a process of institutional change. Institutional change is a long 
process and it takes time to build new market institutions and entrench them in an 
economic system (Murrel and Wang, 1993; World Bank, 2001). More specifically, 
Arrow (2001, p. 91) explained the state’s market-guiding role: ‘Although the role of 
government in directing economic activity in a healthy economy is limited, transition 
does require guidance. The only source of general guidance for the economy is the state, 
and there is no denying that appropriate policy and leadership could considerably 
smooth transition.’ 
Given the leading role of the state in economic transition, the interaction between 
market liberalisation and state control of resources could affect strongly entrepreneurial 
activities in both positive and negative ways. It is positive when the state moves the 
economy towards more market-oriented changes such as perfection of market 
mechanisms including market entry, etc. providing further room for entrepreneurs to 
flourish; and it could be negative if the state strengthens its control over the allocation 
of key resources preventing private entrepreneurs from accessing to those resources for 
development.  As discussed above, due to state-dominated ownership of all economic 
activities, enterprises had to rely on the state for their access not only to production 
factors (capital, land and other natural resources), but also to basic inputs (energy and 
utilities). In China as well as other transitional economies, market reform led to the 
development of markets for these resources, and the emergence of entrepreneurship 
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would not be possible if the state did not reduce its control of and restriction on the 
access to these resources. Therefore, the dynamics and performance of the private sector 
would depend significantly on the extent and ways of releasing the state’s control of 
these key resources. Moreover, state dominance through sole ownership or SOE 
presence means state monopoly in the markets, implying distortions of factor markets 
and the existence of substantial rents. The literature on rent and rent-seeking suggests 
that the existence of rents due to state interventions during market transformation is 
inevitable and there are certain rents that are growth-enhancing (Khan, 2004), but a lot 
of rent-seeking activities are damaging the economy. The existence of rampant 
corruption is a testimony of this development. A crucial question here is whether the 
state is able to manage and utilise these rents to enhance economic development. For 
example, the state can promote private investment by transferring the rents to 
entrepreneurs through market entry and participation or the state can use the rents for 
financing public goods provision. In addition, the existence of rents leads to another 
important question of how these rents can be distributed and used in an equitable 
manner. The way in which the state deals with the rents in transition in terms of the 
allocation and distribution will influence the ways in which private entrepreneurial 
activities take place. We will examine these issues in the context of China’s market 
transition and the evolution of private entrepreneurship.  
II. State control of resources and private 
entrepreneurship in the initial stage of reform: 1978–92 
One key feature of the early stage of reform in China was the dual-track price system 
with partial market liberalisation. Following the rapid and successful transformation of 
agricultural cooperatives under the commune system to a household-based production 
system, market exchanges were gradually allowed to take a greater share along with 
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planning channels in line with the application of a contract responsibility system in 
industrial enterprises later on. Liberalisation took place progressively in the product 
markets, from consumer goods to materials and inputs for agricultural and industrial 
production. Gradual marketisation created ample opportunities for the expansion of 
non-state private businesses through exploiting the huge gaps between demand and 
supply resulting from the acute shortage problems under the planning mechanism 
(Garnaut et al., 2001). Observing the ways private business activities emerged outside 
the state sector, Lu (1994) concluded that new private businesses in this period had 
many features of Kirznian entrepreneurship. Additional market opportunities, although 
limited, came from the Government’s initial steps to open domestic markets to the 
outside world, with a focal policy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), especially 
overseas Chinese FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan to the coastal areas. Total FDI 
increased from US$7.4 billion in the period 1979–85 to US$18.6 billion in the period 
1986–91 (Wu, 2009, p. 34). Initial opening to FDI promoted trading activities between 
local entrepreneurs and their counterparts in Hong Kong, which emerged in the late, 
1970s (Tsai, 2007, p. 55). 
China’s non-state sector2 had its rapid expansion and contribution to output and 
employment in the 1980s. Song (2015, p. 190) indicates that, in the period 1978–92, the 
share of SOEs in gross industrial output value decreased from 78 per cent to 48 per cent 
while that of the non-state sector grew from more than 22 per cent to 52 per cent 
correspondingly. It is notable that, of the change in the share of the non-state sector, 
                                            
2 Conceptually, the non-state sector includes collectively owned enterprises, private enterprises, joint-
venture enterprises, overseas Chinese enterprises and foreign enterprises (Lin et al., 1996:215). Among 
them, collectively owned enterprises can be urban non-state and township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
TVE was used for the first time in, 1984 by the State Council to describe commune and brigade 
enterprises (Song, 2015:189). TVEs constitute a major part of the non-state sector in terms of output, 
employment shares and the number of enterprises (Lin et al., 1996). This feature will be shown in the 
text. Despite the differing types, entrepreneurship is the nature of all these enterprises as they are exposed 
to market rules in their operation. Lu (1994) and Huang (2008) described entrepreneurs as those operating 
private enterprises and TVEs.  
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collectively owned enterprises accounted for most of the change while private 
enterprises expanded to nearly 10 per cent. During the first stage of reform, the 
institutional setting had limited formal recognition of the position that private 
entrepreneurs and their business activities take. Their subordinate or auxiliary position 
resulted from the Chinese Government’s experimental approach while a dominant 
perception of private entrepreneurs as capitalists and exploiters prevailed (Garnaut et 
al., 2001). Most importantly, there were no clearly defined private property rights 
(Huang, 2008). The rapid expansion of non-state enterprises with their institutionally 
disadvantageous position has, however, been a big puzzle to many economists. From an 
institutional perspective, Huang (2008, p. 34) suggested that in the context of property 
rights security was not institutionalised; what made potential entrepreneurs willing to do 
business was directional liberalism—that is, policy promises and symbolic actions 
made by government leaders show the Government’s reform intentions. In addition, as a 
way of responding to ideological and regulatory obstacles, many privately owned 
enterprises were registered as collectively owned enterprises, leading to a phenomenon 
of ‘red hat’ firms in the 1980s and, 1990s (Garnaut et al., 2001, p. 14).  
 
Table 1. Annual Average Growth Rate of Output and Total Factor Productivity 
(per cent) 
 1980–88 1980–84 1984–88 
State sector    
Output 8.49 6.77 10.22 
TFP  2.40 1.80 3.01 
Collective sector    
Output 16.94 14.03 19.86 
TFP  4.63 3.45 5.86 
Source: World Bank (1992). 
Productivity performance is both an indicator of and a contributing factor to overall 
performance. In this early period of transition, non-state enterprises, particularly 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), had better productivity performance than 
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SOEs, as shown in Table 1. In the period 1980–88, and the sub-periods, 1980–84 and, 
1984–88, the collective sector always had a growth rate of total factor productivity 
(TFP) nearly doubling that of the state sector. It has been widely agreed among scholars 
that the collective sector is in the marketised section of the economy, facing more 
competition and hard budget constraints; however, there would be no less important 
factors contributing to the high growth of output and productivity of the non-state sector 
in terms of the Government’s role in resource allocation during this early stage of 
transition. This could be seen in three dimensions. 
First, there was no clear focus for industrial strategy associated with SOE reform. 
Instead, governments at various levels aimed their reform efforts at improving the 
efficiency performance of all existing SOEs through creating incentives for managers 
and workers. The gradual and experimental approach resulted in the dual-track price 
system, with the planned track and the market track. Importantly, as a result, the dual-
track system created channels for transferring resources, especially raw materials from 
the state sector, and industrial enterprises to the non-state sector through flows between 
planned allocation and market channels (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995, p. 141). 
Moreover, the secular problem of shortage under planning (Kolodko, 2000) contributed 
to excess demand in the market for goods, especially industrial products. The excess 
market demand combined with improved access to materials created highly profitable 
opportunities for non-state firms. As suggested by Jefferson and Rawski (1995), the 
high price gap due to shortages implicitly generated quasi-rents that were partly 
captured by non-state firms. The side effect of the dual-price system, however (and also 
evidence of rent-seeking), was the emerging rampant corruption of SOE managers and 
bureaucrats, as Lu (1994) indicated. 
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Second, local governments played an active and significant role in promoting the 
TVEs, with access to land, production sites, local utility services and flexible taxation. 
An important impetus for local governments, especially at township and village levels, 
to become more involved in non-state business activities was fiscal reform (Xu, 2011). 
In the 1980s, fiscal reform was carried out by dividing the responsibility for and 
allocation of budget revenues and expenditures between the central and local 
governments (province, county and municipality). Local governments were given more 
autonomy for collecting revenues and making spending decisions. This was called the 
fiscal contracting system or the third contract responsibility system (World Bank, 1992), 
or ‘fiscal federalism with political centralisation’ (Zhang, 2002, p. 11). Local 
governments were encouraged to generate revenues depending on local conditions. 
Therefore, the fiscal contracting system created incentives for local governments and 
bureaucrats to promote the development of local businesses (Bouckaert, 2007). With the 
unfavourable institutional setting for private enterprises, the result was that local 
governments increased their nominal stake in local collectively owned enterprises. The 
involvement of local governments created favourable access for TVEs to land, 
production sites and local utility services and created a more equal footing for TVEs 
compared with SOEs. As an example, compared with TVEs, private entrepreneurs had 
to pay higher electricity prices and 2.5 times higher taxes in, 1985 (Chang and Wang, 
1994, p. 445). This fact further explains why private entrepreneurs often adopted the 
red-hat strategy. 
Third, TVEs had favourable access to credit due to the active role of local 
governments in the context of limited credit and a partly commercialised banking 
system. In the 1980s, initial reform of the banking sector took place to establish the 
central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), and four state commercial banks, 
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which were assigned to focus on lending to major corresponding sectors: agriculture, 
industry, construction and foreign trade (Riedel et al., 2007). There was also a 
considerable network of rural and urban credit cooperatives. With limited household 
savings, rural credit cooperatives had strong links with the Agricultural Bank of China 
for their source of funding (Huang, 2008). The close connections with local 
governments gave TVEs a strong position from which to access capital provided by 
rural credit cooperatives. Urban collective enterprises experienced a similar situation. 
Facing a hostile business environment with low status, private entrepreneurs 
understandably used the red-hat strategy to overcome constraints on accessing to the 
most important resources. Arguably, TVEs could be an important platform for private 
enterprises to emerge and grow in the later period of reform.  
It is obvious that TVEs outperformed SOEs, due both to being exposed to market 
conditions with the significant involvement of private entrepreneurship and to some 
favourable access to resources created by local governments. 
The dual-track reform had produced a latently vibrant emergence of private 
entrepreneurs through releasing some productive resources wholly controlled by the 
state sector. Importantly, non-state enterprises contributed to the adjustment of 
industrial structure due to their labour-intensive activities (Lin et al., 1996). The 
unexpected outcome in the sense of ‘growing out of the plan’ (Naughton, 1995) created 
strong competition pressures on SOEs (Jefferson and Rawski, 1995). That became an 
important factor contributing to the deteriorating performance of the state sector, with 
many loss-making SOEs in the late, 1980s, prompting a course of comprehensive 
reform for SOEs after, 1992.  
   17 
III. State control of resources and private 
entrepreneurship in the stage of comprehensive market 
reform: 1993 – present 
Since, 1993, China has undertaken a series of market-oriented reforms and established 
market mechanisms applying to all economic activities; however, the extent of market 
rules and competition varies significantly across sectors of the economy. The important 
aspect is the extent of the role market forces in resource allocation, which can be seen in 
the structure of the enterprise system with a growing share of the private sector. Under 
the overarching framework of institutional reforms, changes in the ways the state 
controls key resources have been a key determinant shaping the evolution of private 
entrepreneurship, in the form of private sector development. 
1. Conducive changes in the institutional environment and market opportunities 
for private enterprises 
Major changes in political ideology and the legal framework to recognise the private 
sector happened after Deng Xiaoping’s tour of southern China in, 1992, during which 
he made several important speeches signaling the supportive view of the Chinese 
leadership of the role of private entrepreneurs in generating the nation’s prosperity 
(Naughton, 2007). Following this event, fundamental changes in the political mind-set 
on private entrepreneurs took place. For example, in September, 1992, the Fourteenth 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress officially adopted a ‘socialist market 
economy’. The Fifteenth CCP Congress recognised private ownership as an important 
component of the economy. This marked a significant change in the official ideology 
towards being supportive of private entrepreneurs. In a related move, there were marked 
changes in the legal framework. The amended, 1999 Constitution acknowledged the 
important role of private businesses in China’s economy (Qian and Wu, p.  2000). 
Related laws followed, enacted to govern the operation of private businesses. 
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The leadership’s continued commitment to the market economy promoted the 
completion of the marketisation process of the economy in three dimensions. In the first 
dimension, there was further completion of liberalisation of domestic goods and product 
markets. Price liberalisation was implemented in, 1993 and, 1994 after the market-
oriented reform gained momentum in, 1992. In, 1997, 85 per cent of agricultural output, 
95 per cent of retail sales and 96 per cent of production materials were sold at market 
prices (Zhang, 2002, p. 12).  
The second dimension is China’s foreign trade liberalisation. Before accession to the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in, 2001, China took major steps to reform its foreign 
trade regime to remove distortions and to become consistent with the international 
trading system. Important reform measures were unification and devaluation of the 
foreign exchange rate and increased access to foreign exchanges for domestic 
producers, removal of entry barriers to export and import activities by granting trading 
rights to manufacturing enterprises, expanding tariffs reduction and removing many 
other kinds of trade barriers as well as the application of other trade policy instruments 
such as import substitution and export promotion (Naughton, 2007). China’s WTO 
accession in, 2001 marked another boom of market opportunities for domestic 
enterprises in terms of foreign market access, technology transfer and the entrance of 
foreign investors into the Chinese economy. While China’s substantial welfare gains 
from the WTO accession were generally acknowledged, deepening trade integration has 
posed a lot of competition pressure on domestic enterprises, especially SOEs. Joining 
the WTO has induced the Chinese Government to carry out more domestic reforms to 
make the country’s business rules and regulations consistent with international 
standards. This resulted in significant reforms of the SOEs in the 2000s. Moreover, 
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national treatment required by the WTO promoted further the status of domestic private 
enterprises in the Chinese economy.   
The third dimension is the surge of FDI inflows into the Chinese economy, which 
was in line with the Government’s clear commitment to market-oriented reform and 
extensive and progressive trade liberalisation. According to Chen (2009), China 
experienced a dramatic increase of annual FDI inflows in, 1992 and, 1993, while there 
were a slowdown and decline between, 1997 and, 2000 when the Asian financial crisis 
hit. China’s accession to the WTO led to a sharp increase of annual FDI inflows, from 
US$33 billion in, 2001 to US$80 billion in, 2008. It is notable that FDI was mainly 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector, accounting for 63 per cent of the total FDI 
inflows (Chen, 2009, p.  336). Large FDI inflows intensified domestic competition and 
demand for China’s production factor endowments. 
It appears there have been many favourable changes in the institutional setting for the 
development of private entrepreneurship. Marketisation and trade liberalisation have 
generated ample market opportunities, but significantly increased competition.  
2. Lack of reform in factor markets and the evolution of private entrepreneurship 
It has been argued above that transformation from a centrally planned economy to a 
market-based one can be seen as a process of releasing productive resources from the 
state to be determined and directed by market rules. Restructuring SOEs is part of such 
a process. In addition, the progress of market reform has come about with market 
liberalisation in all economic sectors. China’s gradual approach has, however, shown 
the proactive and dominant role of the state in the direction and speed of market 
liberalisation. It has been identified that complete liberalisation has only happened in 
product markets, and not factor markets (Huang and Wang, 2010). The factor markets 
are the areas where the state exerts significant control to influence the resource flows 
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and the pattern of economic growth with consequences not in favour of private 
entrepreneurs. This can be seen in the context of SOE restructuring.  
3. SOE restructuring and the expansion of the private sector 
In the 1990s and, 2000s, SOE restructuring was implemented in tandem with 
promotion of private enterprises. In, 1995, radical reforms of SOEs started amid their 
deteriorating performance (particularly in terms of profitability and output growth) since 
the late, 1980s (Qian and Wu, 2000). Reform directions were gradually developed over 
the years. For example, in November, 1993, the CCP’s Decision on Issues Concerning 
the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure set forth the direction for 
the SOE reform that emphasised property rights, separation of ownership and enterprise 
management and allowed for privatisation and diversification of ownership. In October, 
2003, the Third Plenum of the Sixteenth CCP Congress issued the Decision on Issues of 
Perfecting the Socialist Market Economy, which was aimed at deepening SOE reform 
by focusing on shareholding ownership and corporatisation of SOEs. Importantly, the 
SOE reform in this period was different from the previous period in terms of the 
ownership transformation, called gaizhi, and the wide scale of SOE transformation. 
Various measures have been adopted, ranging from bankruptcy, liquidation, listing and 
sales to private firms and auctioning. In the latter half of the 1990s, the process of 
transforming TVEs to private ownership took place progressively as many TVEs were 
facing losses due to their weak competitiveness, rigid management structure and 
decision-making due to collective ownership (Qian and Wu, 2000). Moreover, the 
Government’s official recognition of private property rights and support for private 
entrepreneurship had encouraged many privately run collective enterprises to take off 
their ‘red hats’ to become private firms. As a result, the number of private enterprises 
increased rapidly. At the same time, the number of TVEs declined at a quite rapid pace. 
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The share of SOEs in total gross output continued to decline, giving way to the rapidly 
emerging private sector. 
Figure 1 indicates the trend of a more dramatic increase of private enterprises in the 
industrial sector from 1999 to 2010. The number of SOEs and TVEs had a continuous 
decline. At the same time, the number of foreign-funded enterprises increased quite 
significantly.  




Source: CEIC Database and authors’ compilation. 
From the perspective of resource reallocation, SOE restructuring could be considered 
successful as the process led to a significant transfer of state assets to private 
entrepreneurs using the market mechanism, reducing the state’s fiscal burden created by 
loss-making SOEs. The process was also successful in terms of both making room for 
expansion of the private sector (Xiao et al., 2009) and exploiting the dynamics and 
strength of private entrepreneurship in using resources (assets) more efficiently. There 
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gaizhi. Obviously, the problem of rent-seeking associated with unproductive 
entrepreneurship is unavoidable. However, there is some evidence suggesting the losses 
could be small in some cases due to local governments’ exchange for employment 
protection after privatisation (Garnaut et al., 2006). Moreover, it has been found that the 
growing private sector contributed to reducing unemployment problems created by SOE 
restructuring.  
4. Industrial strategy and asymmetric sectoral distribution of SOEs and non-state 
enterprises 
An important feature of the SOE reform in the 1990s was the Government’s 
introduction of an industrial strategy. In, 1994, the State Council approved ‘An Outline 
of the State Industrial Policies in the 1990s’. The renewed industrial policy identified 
machinery-electronics, petrochemicals, automobile manufacture and construction as 
‘pillar industries’. Later, specific policies for pillar industries were developed, such as 
the industrial policy for the auto industry’ (Lu, 2000). This policy would be one of the 
key factors underlying the approach of SOE reform under the slogan of ‘grasping the 
large, letting the small go’, put forward by the Fifteenth CCP Congress. Consequently, 
some 1,000 SOEs were identified as large ones to be retained with whole state 
ownership when the SOE restructuring began. Subsequently, a group of key sectors has 
been identified as pillar industries, which includes energy, electricity, utilities, 
telecommunication, aviation and shipping. Since the 1990s, there have been some 
changes in the list of the pillar industry group, which now includes equipment, autos, 
electronics, information technology, construction, steel, metals, and chemicals (Baston, 
2014, World Bank and DRC, 2013).  
Industrial policy has become one of the main tools guiding the Chinese Government’s 
new approach to the control and allocation of key resources, especially production 
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factors. Different policy measures have been deployed to implement the Government’s 
industrial policy. First, in line with SOE restructuring, various barriers were erected to 
prevent or limit the entry and competition of non-state enterprises, especially private 
enterprises into certain industrial sectors. Apart from some industries with natural 
monopoly characteristics, there are several oligopolistic or monopolistic industries 
created by administrative measures, generating an ‘administrative monopoly’. 
Administrative barriers include permits and business regulations such as administrative 
inspection, monitoring of firms’ registered business activities and local governments’ 
purchase of goods and services from targeted firms (World Bank and DRC, 2013, pp 
108–9).  
Second, the Government controlled the financial system, especially banking, to 
direct credit to targeted industries, especially SOEs. Consequently, the introduction of 
pillar and strategic industries has a significant effect on the participation of private firms 
and enterprises of other kinds in different sectors of the economy. The outcome is the 
skewed distribution of firms by industry. Based on the data from representative sample 
surveys of private enterprises between, 1994 and, 2005, Yang (2012) shows that private 
firms are concentrated in manufacturing, retail trade, small services and catering. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that there are not many private firms in some manufacturing 
industries that were designated as ‘pillar’ industries. In contrast, very few private 
enterprises operated in sectors such as power, construction, finance and insurance, and 
geology and watering, which are key utility sectors whose output is used by all other 
sectors. This situation remained unchanged from the start of SOE restructuring to the 
time when the deepening SOE reform was going on. The pattern of asymmetrical 
distribution of SOEs and private firms will be further discussed below. 
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5. Controlled financial system and private entrepreneurs’ access to capital 
While market liberalisation led to the retreat of the state in directing goods flows 
between economic sectors and regions, price liberalization made it increasingly 
impossible for the state to distort relative prices between sectors and regions for 
industrialisation (Zhang, 2002). With growing household and firm incomes as a result of 
marketisation, the allocation of financial resources has become the main form of the 
state’s resource control. On the one hand, in line with market reform, the Chinese 
Government gradually promoted the financial system, including banking, stock markets 
and the emergence of non-bank financial firms, to mobilise and channel savings for 
investment demand in the growing economy. On the other hand, the Government took 
the monopoly position in the financial system by using state-owned commercial banks 
and financial corporations with strict entry barriers and regulations. In fact, in line with 
developing the financial system of a market economy, the Government has continued to 
consolidate its dominant position in the financial system since the central-planning 
period. Key state-controlled financial institutions are state-owned commercial banks and 
rural and urban cooperatives. In the 1990s, the Government started to allow the market 
participation of the non-state sector, including shareholding commercial banks and 
foreign banks (Bonin and Huang, 2002; Song, 2005). The participation of non-state 
commercial banks increased in the 2000s; however, state-owned financial institutions 
have been major players in the financial markets. It is clear that the controlled financial 
system enabled the Government to channel most savings to SOEs, particularly SOEs in 
pillar and strategic industries, and to undertake big infrastructure investment projects. 
As a result, the private sector had limited access to capital from the formal banking 
sector. For example, in, 1999, private enterprises received only less than 0.5 per cent of 
loans from state-owned banks, which is in contrast with their contribution of nearly 35 
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per cent of industrial output in, 1998 (Song, 2005, pp 117). Consequently, private 
enterprises had to rely much on informal financing paying much higher borrowing 
costs. 
The monopoly position in the financial markets allowed the Government to impose 
financial repression. Using its monopoly of state-owned commercial banks, the 
Government has been able to set a low level of interest rates for bank deposits and 
lending (Riedel et al., 2007). Moreover, ‘the maintenance of interest rates at artificially 
low levels has made it difficult for domestic savers and investors to see the true price of 
capital’ (Song, 2005, pp 115). Cheap credit has been used to keep many loss-making 
SOEs viable, leading to the well-known problem of non-performing loans in the 
banking system (Riedel et al., 2007).  
By imposing low ceilings on borrowing and lending interest rates, the Government 
has created significant rents, which can be defined by the differences between the actual 
and the would-be market clearing interest rates. The rents would be much higher when 
taking into account the potential value of profitable projects for private entrepreneurs. 
There has been long recognition that the extent of capital market distortions would be 
significant (Young, 2000; Zhang and Tan, 2007; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Brandt et al., 
2013). Huang and Wang (2010) claimed that distortions caused by government 
interventions are not confined to the capital markets, but are also in the labour and 
natural resource markets. Notably, these distortions were substantial. For example, their 
estimates show that the value of factor market distortions was about RMB2.1 trillion in, 
2008—equivalent to 7 per cent of GDP. Moreover, capital-market distortions accounted 
for the biggest share in the total since, 2000 (Huang and Wang, 2010, pp  307). An 
important issue here is how to view these distortions in terms of their impact on the 
private sector development. 
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6. State-led development of land markets and the private sector’s access 
In China, land is owned and managed by local governments in urban areas and by 
collectives in the countryside. Due to its sole ownership of land on behalf of all the 
people, the Government has control of land supply and land-use rights transfer (Tao, 
2014).  
The land market is a contrasting case with the capital market in terms of accessibility 
for private enterprises given a similar feature of government monopoly in the market. 
As a common practice, local governments have the authority to determine and collect 
land-use fees. Many local governments have used access to land as one of the main 
instruments to promote industrial and economic growth. Local governments actively 
promoted land developments for industrial sites. To attract manufacturing enterprises, 
many local authorities set low land-use fees. In many cases, land-use fees were only 
equal to or even lower than, the cost of land development (including compensation for 
existing land users, land-clearing costs and infrastructure building costs). In the past two 
decades, due to local competition in pursuit of rapid economic growth, many local 
governments have tried to reduce the cost of land development to create low land-use 
fees. The main method used is paying low land compensation fees to local farm 
households as most land transfers involve agricultural and rural land. Low land-use fees 
have been considered an important factor promoting rapid industrial development in 
many localities; however, the consequences of industrial land development are soaring 
land disputes and demonstrations. Land grabs are becoming a big concern for the 
Chinese Government. On this aspect of land market development, it appears that 
governments at various levels have used their monopoly position of sole ownership to 
release land resources with low prices for industrial enterprises, including private 
enterprises. Conceptually, distorted industrial land prices have implicit government 
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subsidies, which are equivalent to implicit rents. Otherwise, industrial development 
would have been constrained by rising land prices due to rising demand from industrial 
investment.  
Another aspect of land market development is urbanisation and residential land 
expansion (Tao, 2014). Rapid industrialisation has promoted urbanisation through 
attracting millions of rural migrants. Urbanisation, in combination with increasing 
income levels, has created huge demand for new housing and residential land. Excess 
demand for urban and industrial land use has caused land prices to soar due to the 
government-controlled supply of land. Recognising the rapid growth of demand for 
land, local governments have actively managed the supply of land for urban and 
industrial uses. Being able to control land supply has enabled local governments to 
determine land-use prices and collect substantial revenue for their budgets. Importantly, 
soaring land prices in many locations with rapid industrial and urban expansion have 
generated substantial rents, which can be defined here as the difference between the 
market price and the cost of land supply by the Government. Moreover, there could be 
additional rents when the actual market value of land was higher than the sale price 
determined by the Government. Revenues for local government budgets from 
residential land sales or auctions have been used mainly for building infrastructure. On 
this aspect of land market expansion, the Government’s monopoly in land supply has 
generated rents that were captured by the Government for public investment, but it is 
achieved at the expenses of the rural farmers.  
In relation to land, the Government also has monopoly power over other natural 
resources such as energy (electricity, oil) and public utilities and other natural 
endowments. It has been argued that government control of key sectors (coal, 
electricity, oil and water) has distorted the markets in favour of industrial development. 
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Huang and Wang’s (2010) estimates suggest these distortions were significant during 
the period 2000–08, ranging from 3.6 to 6.4 per cent of GDP. Again, government 
control of resources has created significant economic rents, which were used to support 
industrialisation.  
7. Beneficial aspects of the state control of resources during market reform 
Since the SOE restructuring process started in the 1990s, the Government has made 
effective interventions in factor markets, which have created substantial rents. Its 
dominant position in these markets has helped the Government to mobilise resources, 
especially financial resources to build large scale infrastructure. Large SOEs have large 
undertakings in building public infrastructure. Government-led infrastructure 
investments have had both short-term and long-term effects on economic growth 
through long-term productivity growth as these projects reduced firms’ transaction 
costs. In this sense, government control of resources to generate key infrastructure has 
been supportive of the development of private entrepreneurship. Xiao et al. (2009, pp 
166) showed the impressive achievements of China in infrastructure building. For 
example, the total length of highways increased from 1.16 million km in, 1995 to 3.46 
million km in, 2006. At the same time, the railway network expanded from 59,700 km 
to 77,100 km, and there was a huge increase of mobile phone subscribers, from eight 
million to 610 million. In terms of value, Zhang et al. (2012, p. 9) reported that the 
annual amount of public expenditure increased from RMB73.2 billion in, 1997 to 
RMB1.270 billion in, 2010 at the 2005 constant price. This observation is consistent 
with one made by Naughton (2010, p. 446) about China’s approach: ‘Public ownership 
can be used to exploit market power and generate revenues for investment and public 
goods’ creation.’ The active and effective role of the Chinese Government in 
undertaking market transition has given rise to a notion of China’s development model. 
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To some extent, Khan’s (2004) observation that a state with strong capacity can 
generate and manage rents that are growth-enhancing seems to be relevant to China’s 
experience.  
In another dimension, the rents created by government control of resource and factor 
markets, despite being a market distortion, have been used as strong incentives to attract 
and support investment from the non-state sector. Many studies have suggested that this 
has been an important factor contributing to China’s investment-driven pattern of 
growth.  
8. What are the inefficiency effects of resource control and when did they worsen? 
Distorted investment patterns  
Despite generating investment effects for growth, state-maintained low resource 
prices appear to have led to some overinvestment in manufacturing (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2006), resulting in lower investment returns. From the 1990s to the 2000s, the 
investment cost of $1 additional growth increased from $3 to $4 (Zheng et al., 2009, 
p878). Excessive investment has gradually accumulated to generate China’s structural 
imbalances of economic growth (McKay and Song, 2010). While there is a certain 
rationale for the intervention of the Government in some industries with natural 
monopoly characteristics, the growth of the private sector with its better performance 
has caused concerns about the Government’s dominance in these industries. Figure 2 
presents the share of the state sector in total assets and output in a number of industrial 
subsectors in, 2011. It suggests a clear difference between the total asset share and the 
output share of SOEs. There are only four subsectors in which the asset share is equal to 
or greater than the output share: petroleum and gas, processing of nuclear and petroleum 
materials, tobacco, and water supply (these industries appear to be pure state 
monopolies). In several other subsectors, the output share is significantly smaller than 
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the asset share held by the SOEs. This means that where there is some participation of 
the non-state sector, the state control of resources (capital or assets) becomes less 
efficient due to competition and the inherent weaknesses of some SOEs. This situation 
suggests that further reduction of state control in these industries would enhance the 
output growth of those sectors.  











Source: Zhang and Freestone (2013). 
 
The above situation is consistent with information in Figure 3. From 2000 to 2013, 
the state’s share of assets and output in the industrial sector declined steadily. Moreover, 
there is always a gap between the asset share and the output share, with the asset share 
always higher than the output share. It would therefore be growth-enhancing if there 
were some further reduction in the state’s holding of assets in some industrial 
subsectors.  
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Figure 3. Asset and Gross Output Share of State-Controlled Enterprises (per cent) 
 
Sources: CEIC Database; authors’ estimates. 
Unequal access to resources, rent-seeking and unproductive entrepreneurship 
It is well known in literature on entrepreneurship that access to credit or capital is 
one of the most important issues for a private enterprise to succeed in the market. The 
lack of capital prevents private firms from taking up profitable opportunities for 
business start-ups or expansion. Deepening SOE reform has forced state-owned 
commercial banks to operate on a commercial basis and look for profitable private 
enterprises to which to lend (Firth et al., 2009). The tradition of favouring the SOEs has 
remained, however, meaning access to bank credit is a significant challenge for private 
enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are the main form 
of private entrepreneurship (Shen et al., 2009). Financial repression in China creates a 
contradiction that has long emerged in the China’s financial markets: there is substantial 
excess demand on the one hand, and a limited supply of credit for entrepreneurs on the 
other. Therefore, there exist rents that could be significant due to the gap between the 
market clearing level and the regulated interest rate. The rents could be much more 
larger if we take into account the opportunity costs of forgone market opportunities 
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To overcome credit constraints, many private enterprises have used informal 
channels to obtain loans or credit. The guanxi network3 of Chinese entrepreneurs has 
been long well known (Liao and Sohmen, 2001). Because the state has significant 
control over bank credit and other resources, government officials in charge of 
managing resources have an advantageous position from which to access capital and 
resources. Consequently, the guanxi approach has been expanded to overcome 
constrained access to key business resources among many private entrepreneurs with 
benefits of sharing the available rents to both government officials and private firms. 
The scope of guanxi has also been extended to seeking government subsidies and 
market opportunities through contracts in developing infrastructure projects. Actually, 
rent-seeking and corruption has become a worrying trend as a result of market transition 
process (Wu and Huang, 2008). 
Several studies have documented the evidence of private firms trying to get bank 
loans or to gain access to government subsidies through political connections (Zhou, 
2009; Bai et al., 2006; Wu and Cheng, 2011). Similarly as for other resources, 
especially land and property development, state control is likely to create unproductive 
entrepreneurial activities due to the speculative nature of the market in the context of the 
Government’s controlled supply of land in localities with high demand for housing and 
residential land. In a sense, there should be a concern as there have been some 
entrepreneurs who concentrate their investment in political connections for profitable 
opportunities. While quantitative evidence remains to be a challenge, this kind of 
unproductive entrepreneurship, conceptualized by Baumol (1990), is a real fact in 
                                            
3 Generally, Guanxi is a Chinese popular term referring to interpersonal or social relationship and connections 
(Calisle and Flynn, 2005). 
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China’s fast growing private sector as already mentioned by several scholars, 
particularly Wu and Huang (2008).  
Some evidence has been found showing that private enterprises with political 
connections perform better than those without (Choi and Zhou, 2001; Faccio, 2006). 
Whether this trend is consistent or not, what matters is that this kind of better 
performance is not based on competition and efficiency grounds, which is crucial for 
long-term productivity growth. A more important issue is the disincentive and negative 
spill-over effects of the unequal and restricted access to productive resources. Private 
firms are induced to invest in political connections for potential profitable opportunities. 
Those private firms, especially SMEs, with high potential of innovations and 
productivity growth, but without political connections would find it hard to get start-up 
capital and other forms of government support for R&D while less-productive firms 
with political connections continue to stay in the industry, preventing the process of 
technological change from taking place in many of the industries.  
Financial performance of the state-controlled and non-state sectors 
SOE restructuring has played an important role in promoting SOE performance, and 
the growth of SOEs still makes an important contribution to economic growth and 
government revenues through taxation. Given their large share of fixed assets in many 
industries, especially key and pillar industrial subsectors, an important question is how 
the SOEs performed compared with other non-state firms.  
Figure 4 shows industrial enterprise performance in terms of profit rate during, 
2000–13. Before the global financial crisis (GFC) in, 2008, the SOEs had a substantially 
higher and faster growing profit rate than non-state enterprises. One explanation could 
be the SOE reform in the early, 2000s—as well as their favourable access to cheap bank 
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credit and other supports provided by the government. Their performance quickly 
worsened, however, after, 2008 and became closer to the level of the non-state sector.  
Figure 4. Profit Rate (Profits/Sales) of Industrial Enterprises, 2000–13 
 
Source: CEIC Database; authors’ estimates. 
Figure 5 shows the performance of industrial enterprises in terms of returns on assets 
(ROA) during, 2000–13. Before, 2008, SOEs showed significant improvement in their 
ROA, which could be due to the reasons given above; however, the SOEs appeared to 
have consistently lower ROA than the non-state sector. There was a similar trend to that 
with the profit rate in that the SOEs’ performance in terms of ROA worsened after, 
2008. The ROA gap between the SOEs and the non-state sector became larger. Baston 
(2014) suggested that the trend of worsening performance of the SOEs after, 2008 
indicates the structural problems of the SOE sector, with loss-making SOEs, despite the 
fact that deepening SOE reform had helped boost the performance of many SOEs 
through corporatisation and improved corporate governance. This suggests state control 
of assets be reduced by restructuring inefficient SOEs and allowing more participation 
by private enterprises. This would result in the more competitive and productive use of 
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Source: CEIC Database; authors’ estimates. 
Changes in resource control and productivity performance  
Further assessment of the efficiency of the state control of resources could be seen in 
the TFP performance in relation to financial performance.  
Based on the estimation of labour productivity and growth accounting simulations, 
Brandt and Zhu (2010) provided some evidence of the impacts of state control of 
resources on the productivity performance of SOEs compared with non-SOEs, as shown 
in Table 2. In the period 1988–98, the labour productivity of non-SOEs was nearly 
double that of SOEs (6.17 per cent versus 3.46 per cent). The TFP growth of the non-
SOEs had a greater impact on the growth of the TFP of the two sectors. Notably, the 
data show that capital distortions played a more important role in promoting the 
productivity of SOEs, while they had a much smaller effect on promoting the 
productivity of non-SOEs. In contrast, an increase in investment had little effect on the 
labour productivity of both sectors. Therefore, capital control was a significant factor 
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During the , 1998–2007, SOEs had substantially higher labour productivity growth 
than non-SOEs. This could be due to the deepening of SOE reform that makes SOEs 
larger with more access to credit. In this period, the TFP growth of non-SOEs and SOEs 
had a quite similar effect on the labour productivity of other sectors. Again, investment 
had less impact on the labour productivity growth of non-SOEs than SOEs. It appears 
that, compared with the 1988–98 period, the SOEs’ TFP performance improved 
significantly and was the main contributor to labour productivity growth, rather than 
investment. Most importantly, capital market distortions had a significant negative 
impact on the labour productivity growth of non-SOEs. In contrast, SOEs clearly 
benefited from capital market distortions. Therefore, in line with the development of 
factor markets, the state control of resources had significantly negative effects on the 
performance of non-SOEs, and private enterprises in particular. 
Table 2. Reforms Related to Resource Control and Labour Productivity Growth 
(counterfactual simulations) (per cent) 
Item 
 
1988–98  1998–2007  
Non-SOEs SOEs Non-SOEs SOEs 
Benchmark model 6.17 3.46 8.48 11.15 
No TFP growth in non-state sector 2.00 –0.71 1.87 4.54 
No TFP growth in state sector 5.52 2.82 4.95 7.62 
No capital market distortions 6.10 –0.34 9.01 9.03 
No increase in investment rates 
since, 1988 or, 1998 
6.00 3.29 7.91 10.58 
Source: Brandt and Zhu (2010).  
Overall, the examination of the financial and productivity performance of the SOE 
and non-state sectors has shown that the state’s control of resources, in terms of 
interventions in the factor markets, had negative impacts on the performance of private 
enterprises, despite their better performance in general as compared with SOEs. This 
means that SOE restructuring and the change in focus of state resource control have 
promoted the performance of the state sector, but at the expense of efficiency losses of 
private enterprises in the non-state sector.  
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IV. Concluding remarks 
We have used the framework of entrepreneurship development to analyse the pattern 
and impact of change in the state’s control of resources on the emergence and evolution 
as well as outcomes of private entrepreneurship in China during market transition over 
the past 30 years. In this framework, entrepreneurship development depends on two sets 
of factors: business environment (legal and regulatory framework, market opportunities 
and cultural factors) and enterprise resources (production factors and entrepreneurial 
ability). State-led resource allocation during transition is considered to play a central 
role in determining the resources needed for the emergence and evolution of private 
entrepreneurship in China.  
The examination of SOE reform and change in the state’s control of resources has 
shown that private entrepreneurship has emerged and developed robustly in the context 
of China’s market reform. Apart from improving the environment for private 
entrepreneurship, the change in the ways the Government controls key productive 
resources has had significant impacts on the performance of private enterprises. In the 
most recent years, when the product markets have been liberalised, state interventions in 
factor markets have had more negative impacts on the performance of the private sector. 
Given a larger share and better performance of private enterprises, reducing the state’s 
control of key resources would promote productivity and economic growth in the future. 
The analysis suggests that more competition and better use of productive resources 
would require lowering and removing entry barriers to private enterprises in key or 
pillar industries and services, particularly financial and banking systems. Increased 
participation of private firms in key industries and services will improve the access of 
the whole private sector to key resources, especially capital and credit. Recent growing 
investment and participation of private firms in financial and banking activities show 
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positive signs of financial resource allocation 4 . However, the change in the 
government’s regulatory and policy to increase private sector role in allocation of key 
resources could not be made possible without its links with broader framework of 
institutional changes designed to direct more entrepreneurial efforts into more 
productive uses.  Institutional changes and adjustments should be initiated whenever 
there are gaps and loopholes found in developing the market system for better 
protection of private property rights, more effective regime of contract enforcement and 
necessary regulations to ensure the social accountability and transparency of the 
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